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This  paper presents an Arrow-type result which can be simply demonstrated to hold within the standard
domain  of welfare economics: in the   Edgeworth Box, a best allocation must assign all goods to ( m×n)
a  single individual. Allowing the Social Welfare Function to take account of envy-freeness, or other
related constructions, does not significantly resolve this problem.
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1 Introduction
Probably  the most familiar, if not the simplest, problem in welfare economics is as follows. There are
fixed  amounts of several goods to be allocated between several individuals, each of whom has
conventionally-structured  preferences over his (her) own assignment of goods. The problem is to rank,
i.e.,  to place in order of social preference, the various feasible allocations of these goods, and for this
ranking to respect individual preferences in two specific ways. 
Firstly, the  Pareto condition requires that allocation  x is strictly  preferred to (“better than“) allocation
y,  if each individual strictly prefers his assignment in  x to his assignment in  y.  Figure 1 is the familiar
representation of the 2×2 case. With the solid indifference curves,   a is a Pareto-efficient allocation, as
is  any other allocation on the dotted contract curve. For any allocation not on the contract curve, there
exists another which is better, because Pareto-superior.
The second condition,  Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives,  requires the ranking of any pair of
allocations   to depend on individuals’ preferences only over (their own assignments in)  x and  y. { x, y}
The  force of this condition emerges if it is additionally required that a social preference ordering be
constructible  for any admissible, albeit hypothetical, profile of individual preferences. Given this, IIA
imposes  on the social preference ordering a requirement of consistency across different individual
preference profiles.
In  a less structured context, i.e., where the available alternatives are abstract items over which any
individual  may have any coherent preference ordering, the implications of these conditions are well
known.  Arrow’s theorem states that Pareto and IIA can together be satisfied only by a  dictatorial Social
Welfare  Function. That is, there is some specific individual  j such that, for any profile of individual
preferences, the social preference ordering corresponds exactly to  j’s individual ordering. 
It  is only relatively recently (Bordes, Campbell and Le Breton, 1995) that the equivalent result has been
confirmed  to hold in the more structured economic environment described above, i.e., in the  Edgeworth
Domain.
1 In this paper we demonstrate  an Arrow-like proposition which is logically weaker than that
of Bordes   et al.  However it is still a strong result, and can not only be obtained with great simplicity,
but can also be generalised  in a novel direction. It concerns the possibility of a best allocation, that is,
one which has  no other allocation ranked above it. Since in the Edgeworth Domain there is an infinite2
number  of possible allocations, then it cannot be assumed that a best allocation always exists. But it can
be easily shown that if it does exist then it must assign all of the available goods to one individual.
The  basic argument can be sketched immediately, with reference to Figure 1. Allocation  a assigns
positive  amounts of each good to each individual and, given the solid indifference curves, is Pareto-
efficient.  Suppose that it is a best allocation, and is therefore at least as good as each of  b and  c,  as
shown.  (The requirements on  b and  c will soon become apparent, as will the  fact that such allocations
can always be located.)  
Individual  1 prefers  a to  b,  but could have preferred  b to  a,  as indicated by a dashed indifference curve.
In  that case, 2's preferences being unchanged,  b would have been Pareto-superior to  a.  Each individual’s
preferences with respect to { a, c} are unchanged so  that, for this hypothetical profile, IIA implies that
a is at least as good as  c. It follows that, for this profile,  b is better than  c.
Now  consider another hypothetical profile where, instead, individual 2 prefers  c to  a,  again as indicated
by a dashed indifference curve. For this profile  c is Pareto-superior  to  a.  Given that  each individual’s
preferences  with respect to { a, b}  are unchanged, IIA implies here that  a is at least as good as  b.  It
follows  that, for this profile,  c is better than  b. But individual preferences with respect to { b, c}  are
invariant throughout; 1 prefers  c to  b and 2 prefers  b to  c. Hence there is a violation of IIA.
So  we cannot, without contradiction, assume that  a is a best allocation. But there is nothing special
about   a.  For any Pareto-efficient allocation in the interior of the Edgeworth Box a similar argument can
be  constructed, in that other allocations corresponding to  b and  c may always be found. This would be
the  case even were the contract curve to coincide (in part) with the edge of the box. The only points
immune  to this argument, i.e., for which allocations such as  b and  c cannot be found, are the endpoints
of contract curve, where one individual is assigned all the available goods.  No other allocation can be
best.3
2 The Edgeworth Dictator
In this section we formalise and generalise  the argument just outlined. There are  m goods  , ( g’1 , . . , m)
each  available in a given quantity  , and each infinitely divisible between  n individuals  . wg>0 ( i’1 , . . , n)
The available endowment is therefore  . w ’ ( w1, . . , wm)
An   assignment   is any non-negative m-tuple, where   is the quantity of good  g assigned xi ’ ( xi1, . . , xim) xig
to  individual  i.  Given  w,  an  allocation   is any n-tuple of assignments such that  . x’( x1, . . , xn) j
i
xig#wg
Let   denote the set of all allocations, given  w. P( w)
Each  individual has a (complete, transitive) ordering   defined on assignments, and assumed to be Ri
continuous,  strictly increasing and strictly convex. Call this a  standard preference ordering. In the usual
manner,    denotes that  i weakly prefers   to  .  Strict preference is denoted by  , xiRiyi xi yi xiPiyi ] ¬yiRixi
and indifference by  .  xiI iyi ] [ xiRiyi & yiRixi]
A  profile   is any n-tuple of standard preference orderings, one for each individual. For the D’( R1, . . , Rn)
2×2  case,   and  D can be depicted in the familiar Edgeworth Box. In Figure 1 the solid indifference P( w)






A social preference ordering R, defined on  ,  is required at any profile  D.  The function  ,  i.e., P( w) R’f( D)
the Social Welfare Function (SWF), is to satisfy:
2
ParetoIf   for all  i, then  xiPiyi xPy
IIA The  social ordering of any pair of allocations  depends  on each individual  i’s  ordering { x, y}
only of  { xi, yi}
At  any given profile  D,  the social ordering  may identify a  best allocation, i.e., some  x such that  R’f( D) xRy
for  all  .  If  x is a best allocation, then the Pareto condition implies that there can be no y0P( w) y0P( w)
such  that  .  In Figure 1 this restriction is represented by the (dotted) contract curve; given ￿i: yiPixi
profile   ,  neither of allocations  b and  c can be best. As we now show, however, IIA additionally implies D0
that even  a cannot be best.4
Proposition 1 In  the  m×n Edgeworth Domain  ,  given Pareto and IIA, at any profile  D a best ( m$2 )
allocation  (if one exists) must assign all of the available goods to one individual, i.e.,
is characterised by   for some individual  j. xj’w
Proof Assume  to the contrary that at   there  exists a best allocation  a which does not assign all D0
goods  to one individual. Then (allowing for an appropriate re-labelling of individuals and
goods) there must be a pair of distinct  individuals {1,2} and a pair of distinct goods {1,2}
such that:
a11 >0 a22 >0
Given any   such that: { *i, gi, .i}
0<( n&2 ) .i <gi <*i <aii ( i’1 , 2 )
define allocations  b and  c as follows (where  ): j￿1 , 2
b11’ a11 & *1 b21’ a21 % *1& ( n&2 ) .1 bj1’ aj1% .1
b22’ a22 & g2 b12’ a12 % g2& ( n&2 ) .2 bj2’ aj2% .2
c11’ a11 & g1 c21’ a21 % g1& ( n&2 ) .1 cj1’ aj1% .1
c22’ a22 & *2 c12’ a12 % *2& ( n&2 ) .2 cj2’ aj2% .2
aig’ big’ cig (i’1 , . . , n ;g￿1 , 2 )
Figure 2 illustrates this construction. For any standard preferences  : Ri
(1) & & c1P 1b1 b2P 2c2 bjI jcj (j￿1 , 2 )
(2) & bjP jaj cjP jaj (j￿1 , 2 )5
















Assume that  , so that (4) is satisfied.
3 gi<ˆ gi
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0
n)
by Pareto: .  bP 1a
by IIA: aR1c
and thus: bP 1c





2, . . , R
0
n)
by Pareto: cP 2a
by IIA: aR2b
and thus: cP 2b
But from (1) this is a violation of IIA. So the initial assumption is false.
QED
Proposition  1 applies to any given profile. But let  x be an allocation such that   for some individual xj’w
j,  and let  y be any other allocation. Given increasingness, each individual  i‘s  preference ordering of
 is invariant across all profiles. So IIA implies that if   at any profile then   at every profile. { xi, yi} xRy xRy
From  Proposition 1 it then follows that the set of best allocations must be the same at every profile.
Thus:6
Proposition 2 If    identifies a best allocation at some  DN then, given  Pareto and IIA, there is R’f( D)
a  non-empty set of individuals D such that, at every  D,   x is a best allocation if and only
if   for some  .  xj’w j0D
Proposition 3 If    identifies a uniquely best allocation at some  DN then, given Pareto and IIA, R’f( D)
there  is an individual  j such that, at  every  D,   x is a best allocation if and only if  . xj’w
Propositions  1-3 are somewhat weaker than the Arrovian result of Bordes  et al,  i.e., that the SWF must
be  dictatorial. But 1-3 are nevertheless substantial in themselves. Furthermore, they can be extended in
a  direction which, in one respect, represents an advance on Bordes  et al.  This involves a weakening of
IIA, to be described in the next section.
3 Envy-freeness in the Social Welfare Function
An allocation  x is  envy-free if  ,  that is, if no individual  i strictly prefers the assignment of ￿i, j: xiRixj
some other individual  j.  Figure 3 illustrates for the 2×2 case, where to any allocation   there x’( x1, x2)
corresponds  a  swap allocation   such that  .  In the Edgeworth Box,   is obtained xN’( x1N, x2N) xiN’xj ( i￿j) xN
from   x by a 180 E rotation about the equal-assignment allocation  .  Then  x is envy-free if neither ( w/ 2, w/ 2 )
individual   i strictly prefers   to  .  Given standard preferences in the Edgeworth Domain, there always xiN xi
exist allocations which, like  a in Figure 3, are both envy-free and efficient.
4 
Consider the following principle:
EF If  x is envy-free and  y is not, then  xPy
Whatever  the appeal of this principle, it is not consistent with IIA, as may be confirmed by a 2×2
example.  Define allocations   and  ,  and profiles  ,  as represented d’ ( ( 6 , 4 ) , ( 4 , 6 ) ) e’ ( ( 1 , 9 ) , ( 9 , 1 ) ) { D, DN}
by the following utility functions.7
D   so that for  : u1’ x
2
11 x12 u2’ x21 x
2
22 i￿j
ui( di) ’ 144 ui( dj) ’ 96 ui( ei) ’ 9 ui( ej) ’ 81





ui( di) ’ 96 ui( dj) ’ 144 ui( ei) ’ 81 ui( ej) ’ 9
In profile  D,  d is envy-free but  e is not, so EF here requires that  . In  profile  DN the reverse is true, dPe
so  EF here requires that  .  But each individual’s ordering of own-assignments in  d and  e is the same ePd
in  DN as in  D, so this is a violation of IIA.
There is, however, a natural weakening of IIA which permits EF. It is:
IIA*  The social ordering of any pair of allocations   depends on each individual  i’s { x, y}
ordering only of  { x1, . . , xn; y1, . . , yn}
IIA*  allows the social ordering of   to differ between profiles  D and  DN,  as EF requires. But EF itself { d, e}
remains  problematic, since it is inconsistent not only with IIA but also with Pareto, as can be seen in the
above  example. According to the invariant individual preferences over own-assignments,  d is Pareto-
superior  to  e.  But at profile  DN EF requires that  .  So even with the weaker IIA*, a SWF which ePd
satisfies Pareto cannot also accommodate EF.
5 
Although  EF therefore cannot be part of it, the question arises as to whether there is any non-dictatorial
SWF which satisfies Pareto together with IIA*. We will show that this is doubtful, in that results similar
to Propositions 2 and 3 can be obtained in this more general setting.
The  outline argument is almost as simple as before. In Figure 3, assume that  a is a best allocation at





2) aR0b aR0c D0
each  individual strictly prefers  a to  aN.  Thus  b (and  c)  can be located sufficiently close to  a such that
individual  1 strictly prefers   to any of .  It is evidently then possible to construct an b1 { a2, b2, c2}
alternative  indifference curve, such as the dashed curve shown, which passes through   and below  , a1 b1
but which leaves undisturbed 1's preferences over all other relevant assignments.






ordering  of   and of   is the same as in  .  At  ,  IIA* thus implies that  , { a1, a2; c1, c2} { b1, b2; c1, c2} D0 D1 aR1c
from which it follows that  . bP 1c






individual’s orderings of   and of   is the same as in  .  At  ,  IIA* thus { a1, a2; b1, b2} { b1, b2; c1, c2} D0 D2
implies  that  ,  from which it follows that  .  But this is a violation of IIA*. So  a cannot be a best aR2b cP 2b
allocation at  .  D0
In  section 5 we formalise and generalise this argument. To do this, however, we need to show that









analytical framework for this.
4 A parametric preference transformation
Individual 1's standard preference ordering   can be represented by the function: R
0
1
x12’ N( u1; x11 , x13 , . . , x1 m)
which  is continuous, increasing in  ,  and for any given   defines a decreasing and strictly convex u1 u1
indifference surface. Given   and  , as in Proposition 1, calibrate   and  N such that: a1 b11 ’ a11 &*1 u1
a12’ N( 0 ; b11 , a13 , . . , a1 m) ’ N( 1 ; a11 , a13 , . . , a1 m)
Given any   such that: b12
N( 0 ; b11 , a13 , a13 , . . , a1 m) < b12# N( 1 ; b11 , a13 , a13 , . . , a1 m)





and a12’ R( 1 ; a11 , a13 , a13 , . . , a1 m) b12> R( 1 ; b11 , a13 , a13 , . . , a1 m)
but also to delimit the transformation in (standard) preferences over assignments other than  . { a1, b1}9
For  notational conciseness we will assume that  ,  but the following applies straightforwardly to any m’3
. Define: m$2
2( x11 , x13 )’ max {x12* "x12 %( 1 &") a12 # N( 1 ; [ "x11 %( 1 &") b11 ] , [ "x13 %( 1 &") a13 ] )
either  (i)  ,   or  (ii)    such that   ￿"$1 ￿">0 "x11 %( 1 &") b11 # a11}
To  illustrate, Figure 4 shows  ,  delineated in each of the three cross-sections defined by N( 1 ; x11 , x13 )
,  intersecting at assignment  .  At a distance   directly below this is located x1 g’a1 g ( g’1 , 2 , 3 ) a1 *1
,  emanating from which are five representative rays. These are shown as dashed where they ( b11 , a12 , a13 )
lie below the indifference surface and solid where above it. 
The  two lower rays, up to their respective points of tangency with the indifference surface, are on  2 by
virtue of both (i) and  (ii). The locus of such tangencies is shown by the dotted arc on the indifference
surface  at  .  The other three rays break through the indifference surface in the plane  . x11 #a11 x1 1’a1 1
They  are on  2 by virtue of (ii), unless and until they disappear again below the surface at some  , x11 >a11
as do two of these. The locus of such points is shown as two dotted curves. 
Within  the dotted boundary, therefore,  2 comprises rays such as those shown (dashed or solid). But
outside  the boundary  2 coincides with  N by virtue of (i). It is everywhere continuous, weakly convex,
and non-increasing.
For any given  ,   and  , let   be any continuous function such that: 80[ 0 , 1 ] k 0<0 k 1>1 J( u1)
for   J( u1)’ 8 u10[ 0 , 1 ]
  is increasing for  , and decreasing for  J( u1) u10[ k 0, 0 ] u10[ 1 , k 1]
J( k 0)’ J( k 1)’ 0
The transformed preference function may now be defined as:
for  R( u1; x11 , x13 ) ’ N( u1; x11 , x13 ) u1#k 0
for  ’ [ 1 &J( u1) ] N( u1; x11 , x13 )% J( u1) 2( x11 , x13 ) u10[ k 0, 1 ]10
’ max {[ 1 &J( u1) ] N( u1; x11 , x13 )% J( u1) 2( x11 , x13 ),
for  [ 1 &8] N( u1; x11 , x13 . . )% 82( x11 , x13 )} u10[ 1 , k 1]
’ max {N( u1; x11 , x13 ),
for  [ 1 &8] N( u1; x11 , x13 . . )% 82( x11 , x13 )} u1$k 1
This  can be described with the aid of Figure 4. Consider first the indifference surface  . N( 1 ; x11 , x13 )
Beyond  the dotted boundary it coincides with  2,  so the transformation leaves it intact here. Within the
boundary, it lies above   2 for  , and below it for  . So here the transformation depresses x11 <a11 x11 >a11
the  surface at all  ,  and raises it at all  .  In effect, it pushes the surface down towards the x11 <a11 x11 >a11
vertex   ,  while pivoting it around the indifference curve  ,  which therefore ( b11 , a12 , a13 ) N( 1 ; a11 , x13 )
remains intact. The magnitude of the distortion is given by the value of  8.
Indifference  surfaces above and below this are similarly transformed, in a manner which preserves
continuity  and increasingness with respect to  .  For each such surface the distortion is unconfined by u1
any  equivalent dotted boundaries. However, its magnitude diminishes to zero for   and  u1#k 0 u1$k 1
except  that, for the latter, increasingness requires each indifference surface to be raised where it lies
below  2, i.e., below rays such as the upper three in Figure 4.
Like   N,  the transformed function  R is continuous, increasing in  ,  and for any given   defines a u1 u1
decreasing  and strictly convex indifference surface.
6 It contains an indifference surface   passing ( u1’1 )
through   and, for a sufficiently large value of  8,  below  . But the transformation leaves intact the a1 b1
represented preferences over each of the following sets of assignments:
4 / {x1* x12 ’ N( 1 ; x11 , x13 ) ’ 2( x11 , x13 )}
60 / {x1* x12 # N( k 0; x11 , x13 )}
61 / {x1* x12 $N( k 1; x11 , x13 )& x12 $2( x11 , x13 )}
and 4 ^ 60^ 61 { b1}^ 60^ 6111
So  far we have assumed arbitrarily given values of  ,    and  .  But let   be the k 0 k 1 *1 x12 ’ a12 % $( a1 3&x1 3)
hyperplane which supports   at  , so that: N( 1 ; a11 , x13 ) a1




2( x11 , x13 )’ max {N( 1 ; x11 , x13 ),a12 % $( a1 3&x1 3)}
So  any assignment   such that   and  ,  can be included in   by taking a x1￿a1 x11 #a11 x12 ’N( 1 ; x11 , x13 ) 4
sufficiently  small value of  .  In Figure 4, the surface enclosed within the lower dotted arc contracts *1>0
towards  , diminishing to zero, as   approaches zero.  a1 *1
Any  assignment   such that   can be included in   by taking sufficiently small  x1 x12 <N( 1 ; x11 , x13 ) 60 *1>0
and  sufficiently large  .  Similarly, any assignment   such that   and k 0<0 x1 x12 >N( 1 ; x11 , x13 )
, can be included in   by taking sufficiently small  . x12 $2( x11 , x13 ) 61 k 1>1
5 IIA* and t-exclusive allocations
We describe allocation  x as   t-exclusive if   for each  i of some  t individuals. Thus, a  t-exclusive xi’w/ t
allocation  shares all goods equally among  t individuals, assigning nothing to the remaining  n&t
individuals. Polar cases  are  ,  where one individual is assigned all of the available goods, and  , t’1 t’n
where all individuals receive an equal share of all goods.
According to  Proposition 1, Pareto and IIA together imply that a best allocation must be 1-exclusive.
Using the apparatus provided in section 4, we now demonstrate:
Proposition 4 In  the  m×n Edgeworth domain  ,  given Pareto and IIA*, at any profile  D a best ( m$2 )
allocation (if one exists) must be  t-exclusive.
Proof Assume to the contrary that at   there exists a best allocation  a which is not  t-exclusive. D0
For each good  g, define:12
and ˜ ag ’ max
i
{ aig} Ag ’ {i * aig’ ˜ ag }
Suppose that   is not identical for each good  g.  Then (re-labelling as necessary) there Ag
exists  some individual 1 and some pair of goods {1,2} such that   and  .  Select any 1 0A1 1 ￿A2
individual  . 2 0A2
Suppose  instead that   is identical for each good  g.  By assumption  a is not  t-exclusive, Ag
so (again re-labelling as necessary) there exists some individual 1 and good 1 such that:
a11’ max
i
{ ai1* ai1<˜ a1} > 0
Select any other good 2, and any individual  . 2 0A2
In either case, therefore, we can find individuals {1,2} and goods {1,2} such that:
a1￿a2
&  either   or  a11 >0 ￿j￿1: aj1#a11 ￿g: xjg>x1 g
&  a22 >0 ￿j￿2: aj2#a22
Define  allocations  b and  c in terms of   as in Proposition 1 where, given any { *i, gi, .i}
,  it is possible to satisfy (4) by taking sufficiently small  .  Reference to *1, *2>0 g1, g2>0
Figure  2 confirms the following additional observations, which draw on Proposition 1 and
on the analysis in section 4.
Consider  individual 1's preferences regarding  .  Suppose that  .  For { a2, b2, c2} a1P
0
1a2
sufficiently  small   we have  (for any  ).  Then, for sufficiently small  , *1>0 a1P
0
1b2 .1>0 *1>0
and sufficiently large  , we have  . k 0<0 { a2, b2, c2}d60
Suppose  alternatively that  .  Since either   or   , then it follows that a2P
0
1a1 a21 #a11 ￿g: a2 g>a1 g
.  So for sufficiently small   we have both   and  . a22$2( a21, a23) *2>0 c2P
0
1a1 c22 $2( c21 , c23 )
Then for sufficiently small   we have  . k 1>1 { a2, b2, c2}d6113
Suppose  lastly that   which implies that  .  For sufficiently small   we have a1I
0
1a2 a21 #a11 *1>0
.  Given also that  ,  then for sufficiently small   and   we have both a204 a1￿a2 *1>0 g2>0
 and  ,  and thus for sufficiently small   we have  .  Given any b2P
0
1a1 b22 $2( b21 , b23 ) k 1>1 b2061
, for sufficiently small   we have   (for any  ); thus for sufficiently small  *2>0 g1>0 a1P
0
1c2 .1>0 *1>0
and sufficiently large   we have  . k 0<0 c2060
Now consider individual 1's preferences regarding   for any  , in which case { aj, bj, cj} j￿1 , 2
. For any   such that  ,  sufficiently small   may be found such that bj’cj>aj aj a1P
0
1aj .i>0
,  and thus for sufficiently large   we have  .  For any   such that a1P
0
1bj k 0<0 { aj, bj, cj}d60 aj
,  since either   or  ,  then it follows that  ,  and so for ajP
0
1a1 aj1#a11 ￿g: ajg>a1 g aj2>2( aj1, aj3)
sufficiently  small   we have  .  For any   such that  ,  and thus k 1>1 { a2, b2, c2}d61 aj a1I
0
1aj
, a sufficiently small   may be found such that  ; then for sufficiently small  aj1#a11 *1>0 aj04 k 1>1
we have  . { bj, cj}d61
From  all of this it follows that   may be found to allow a standard preference { *i, gi, .i}




1a1 { a1, . . , an; c1, . . , cn}
over    are identical to those in  .  So there exists a profile { b1, . . , bn; c1, . . , cn} R
0
1





2, . . , R
0
n)
by Pareto: .  bP 1a
by IIA*: aR1c
and thus: bP 1c
The  equivalent reasoning can be applied in respect of individual 2's preferences, preserving
orderings  over   and over  .  In fact this is slightly  less { a1, . . , an; b1, . . , bn} { b1, . . , bn; c1, . . , cn}





2, . . , R
0
n)
by Pareto: cP 2a
by IIA*: aR2b
and thus: cP 2b
But this is a violation of IIA*. So the initial assumption is false.
QED14
Proposition  4 applies to any given profile. But for any pair   of  t-exclusive  allocations, each { x, y}
individual’s preference ordering of   is invariant across  profiles. So IIA* implies that { x1, . . , xn; y1, . . , yn}
if   at any profile then   at every profile. From Proposition 4 it then follows that  the set of best xRy xRy
allocations must be the same at every profile at which it is non-empty. 
However,  there exist profiles at which no  t-exclusive  allocation other than   is Pareto-efficient. t’1
Figure  3 illustrates a 2×2 example.
7 Suppose that at such a profile there is a best allocation. Then it must
be 1-exclusive; moreover,  so too must be a best allocation at any other profile. Thus (cf. Propositions
2 and 3):
Proposition 5 If    identifies a best allocation at every  D then, given Pareto and IIA*, there is R’f( D)
a  non-empty set of individuals D such that, at every  D,   x is a best allocation if and only
if   for some  .  xj’w j0D
Proposition 6 If    identifies a best allocation at every  D,  and a uniquely best allocation at some R’f( D)
DN,  then, given Pareto and IIA*, there is an individual  j such that, at every  D,   x is a
best allocation if and only if  . xj’w
This  appears to be as far as the present form of argument can lead us. As in section 2, the SWF has not
been  shown to be fully dictatorial. Nevertheless,  Propositions 5 and 6 are substantial in themselves.
They  confirm that even in the restricted Edgeworth Domain, and with the weakened IIA*, it remains
impossible  to make complete, consistent and equitable social choices on the basis of interpersonally non-
comparable individual preferences.15
1. The related literature, however, dates back to Maskin (1976).
2. It  would be more conventional to define Pareto and IIA in terms of individual preferences over
the  relevant allocations  x and  y,  with a separate stipulation that these correspond to (standard)
preferences  over own-assignments. But the formulation used here is more appropriate to what follows
in sections 3 and 5.
3. This  may be elaborated with reference to Figure 2. Given  ,  individual 1 strictly prefers   to  *2 c1 a1
if  and only if  ,  this function corresponding to 1's indifference curve through  . g1<(1[ ( n&2 ) .2] a1
Similarly,  given  ,  individual 2 strictly prefers   to   if and only if .  Given also that *1 b2 a2 g2<(2[ ( n&2 ) .1]
, the required critical values are determined simultaneously as   and  . ( n&2 ) .i<gi ˆ g1’(1[ ˆ g2] ˆ g2’(2[ ˆ g1]
4. For a relatively recent review of the literature on envy-freeness, see Arnsperger (1994).
5. The  inconsistency between EF and Pareto appears to have gone largely unremarked, although
Sugden  (1981, section 4.4) discusses a closely related idea. Indeed, EF as such does not explicitly
feature  in the envy-freeness literature, perhaps reflecting either a tacit awareness of this inconsistency
or a disinterest in the SWF framework.
6. For  any given  ,  all the steps in the construction of  R involve taking either the average or the u1
maximum  of some pair of continuous, decreasing and convex functions. These properties are preserved
under  these operations. For decreasingness and convexity, strictness is preserved in the average if in
either of the original functions, and in the maximum if in both.
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Figure 4: The construction of  2